There has also been some attention to the application of virtue ethics to various fields of practical and professional life (Walker and Ivanhoe) and to its implications for moral education (Carr and Steutel 1999) and the professional practice of teaching and teachers (Dunne and MacIntyre 2003) .
That said, despite that the revival of interest in virtue more or less coincided with the post WWII development of analytical philosophy of education in Britain, former British Commonwealth countries and the USA, educational interest in virtue ethics seems to have been slow on the uptake. Moreover, insofar as educational philosophers have shown much interest in the topic, it would seem that the approach to which they have mostly been drawn is the neo-idealist or social constructivist version of Alasdair McIntyre. Indeed, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that for contemporary philosophers of education -with a few exceptions -virtue ethics has been virtually synonymous with the name of MacIntyre. Given this, the present paper will begin by considering the virtue ethics of MacIntyre and the uses to which his views have to date been put by educational philosophers. While it will be argued that MacIntyre's work certainly contains educationally promising ideas, his overall social constructivist perspective on virtue is also judged here to be less helpful and to be therefore best avoided. In consequence, the paper will argue -closer the virtue ethical mainstream -that while Aristotelian naturalism offers a better overall understanding of the human significance of virtue, there may be a case for a more realist Socratic or Platonic reading of such naturalism. This case will be made with some reference to the work of John McDowell and Iris Murdoch. However, the paper will conclude with particular appreciation of the educational significance and implications of both Murdoch's and McIntyre's perspectives on the significance of stories for moral understanding.
Educational implications and applications of MacIntyre's virtue ethics
In his three large works of the nineteen eighties and nineties (MacIntyre 1981 (MacIntyre , 1988 (MacIntyre , 1992 on which educational philosophers have mainly drawn MacIntyre sought to develop an updated social theoretical conception of virtue ethics that -rejecting Aristotle's 'metaphysical biology' -conceives virtue and virtues as dispositions required to sustain various human professional and other practices in the historically divergent contexts of 'rival' cultural and moral tradition. Insofar as such rival traditions are historically conditioned perspectives -which is all that moral traditions on this view can be -they are not amenable to rational arbitration from some objectively neutral view from no-where and this conception is therefore inherently anti-realist. That said, MacIntyre has sought to resist charges of moral relativism by arguing -in a strikingly Hegelian way -that differences or conflicts between moral traditions are often resolvable in terms of some higher 'synthesis' of rival views.
Still, it is no less clear that MacIntyre's own practical application of this perspective -in at least two highly influential educational papers -has distinct relativist implications. Thus, in one essay -evidently targeted at a notable modern attempt to develop a liberal conception of common education for mainstream schooling (Macintyre 1987 ) -MacIntyre argued that such a project is no longer sustainable in the culturally plural conditions of modern societies in which there can be no large agreement about what is educationally worthwhile. However, in another essay more specifically focused on the possibility of moral education (MacIntyre 1999), he has even more problematically argued that insofar as different social groups are heir to rival moral traditions, it cannot make much sense to try to develop a common school moral education and that there should therefore be a diversity of educational provision concerned to promote different (religiously and otherwise grounded) views of what is morally worthwhile.
While the claims of both these essays must be unsettling to educational theorists concerned to develop accounts of general education or educated sensibility and common moral education, it may also be noted that the uses to which MacIntyre's ideas have been put by recent self-styled postfoundationalist educational philosophers (see especially Carr 1997 especially Carr , 2006 are hardly less alarming. In this respect, it has been explicitly argued that the values, virtues and standards of conduct endorsed by such professional practitioners as teachers are so thoroughly conditioned by local circumstances and contingencies that they are quite immune to any external objective critique. On this view, insofar as there can be no theoretically grounded or evidence-based standards or criteria by which the conduct of local practices might be judged and/or found wanting only the practitioners of such practices are competent to judge on their appropriateness or efficacy. In this light, while it cannot be denied that moral virtues are invariably influenced or shaped by local perspectives, values or beliefs, it does not follow that they are identical with or reducible to such perspectives: indeed, the language of virtue seems to provide something like a universal or crosscultural discourse of moral evaluation by which we might indeed characterize whole cultures or ways of life as unjust, dishonest, lazy, cruel or corrupt (for points along these lines, see Nussbaum 1988 , Carr 1996 . Indeed, this point about the universal character of virtues could hardly have been better made than by the very first generation of modern neoAristotelian virtue ethicist revivalists who precisely argued (against prescriptivists and other non-cognitivists) that moral goodness in general and the goodness of virtue in particular is no less a natural property than size or the colour of hair (Geach 1977; Foot 1978) . By this, of course, they meant not that moral virtues did not require training or cultivation, but rather that our judgements of goodness or human virtue are in principle no less objective than those by which we describe other features of the natural world.
In sum, while MacIntyre is evidently anti-realist in his metaphysics and epistemology and constructivist in his moral philosophy, Aristotle is no less clearly both a realist in his natural philosophy and an ethical or moral naturalist. In this regard, while the latter departs from his great teacher Plato in distinguishing moral from theoretical enquiry as a form of practical reflection or deliberation -a distinction that Anscombe has called 'one of That said, it is also clear that while Aristotle did not significantly distinguish the inferential form of moral wisdom or deliberation (phronesis) from that of technical or productive reasoning (techne), he does clearly distinguish these in terms of their content and ends. In these terms, while technical reasoning is evidently concerned to effect changes in the world via the development of skills or the production of various goods or services, the primary purpose of moral wisdom or reflection -notwithstanding any benefits that the virtuous will no doubt seek to secure in the world -is the cultivation of moral virtue for its own sake. Moral virtues are constitutive of personhood in a way that skills are not. As Aristotle himself strikingly puts it in the Nicomachean Ethics, whereas someone who has developed a particular skill -of, say, craft or musicianship -may subsequently choose whether or not to exercise it, it
is not likewise open to the agent who has cultivated honesty, justice, selfcontrol, courage or compassion via the proper exercise of phronesis or practical wisdom to choose whether or not to exercise such virtues. Any genuine moral virtues must be part of us in a way that skills or not. 'But of all faults of the soul the gravest is one which is inborn in most men, one which all excuse in themselves and none therefore attempts to avoid -that conveyed in the maxim that 'everyone is naturally his own friend' and that it is only right and proper that he should be so, whereas, in truth, this same violent attachment to self is the constant source of all manner of misdeeds in every one of us. The eye of love is blind where the beloved is concerned and so a man proves a bad judge of right, good, honour, in the conceit that more regard is due to his personality than to the real fact, whereas a man who means to be great must care neither for self nor for its belongings, but for justice, whether exhibited in his own conduct or rather in that of another. From this same fault springs also that universal conviction that one's own folly is wisdom, with its consequences that we fancy we know everything when we know as good as nothing, refuse to allow others to manage businesses we do not understand, and fall into inevitable errors in transacting it for ourselves. Every man then must eschew self-love and follow ever in the steps of his better, undeterred by any shame for his ease.' (Plato 1961 (Plato , book 5, 731d -732a, p. 1318 Clearly, the main Platonic departure from Socrates here lies not so much in any denial that virtue is knowledge but in the claim that vice or moral failure is not merely ignorance: Plato's concern is not simply to endorse the point that human moral vision is frequently clouded or obscured but actually to pinpoint the precise source and cause of such obfuscation. Precisely, the source is an undue attachment to self or an egoism that often ensures that our conduct is self-serving. On this view, our moral failure or misperception cannot be laid entirely at the door of ignorance as lack of knowledge since it involves a kind of refusal to recognize what is right or just that is often quite willful: in short, moral misperception seems to be a form of egotistical selfdeceit. While this suggestion raises vexed problems about the logical coherence and/or psychological possibility of self-deception that have much perplexed philosophers down the years, it nevertheless resonates with the common human experience of such emotions as remorse where people have in the past done things that they now regret, that they believe they did not at the time know better than to do and yet for which they now hold themselves responsible on the grounds that they could or should have known better. The common refrain of such remorse is: how could I have been so self-centred or selfish? Moreover, while some of our moral failures may be due as much to over-attachment to others as to selfishness as such, it is likely that even our attachments are often misplaced or infected by vanity and self-interest -so that the general Platonic location of error in egotistical misperception would seem to hit the mark for much of the time.
While this short discussion cannot greatly hope to resolve such time- Aristotelian ethical naturalism in a more Platonic direction that promises a large (albeit un-Platonic) educational role for poetry and other arts in liberating moral vision from the cave of egotistical vanity and delusion -the wheel of this paper is set to come full circle with due recognition of the place that a more faithfully Aristotelian MacIntyre also clearly gives to the moral educational value and importance of literature. For, in After Virtue, he explicitly argues -in a way that chimes well with Murdoch's Platonic repudiation of Plato on the arts -that the very form of practical moral wisdom, is narratival: precisely, that our basic understanding of ourselves and others is that of characters in stories whose lives are concerned with the pursuit of goals and purposes that are more or less morally commendable.
From this viewpoint, it is not just the remote abstractions of Platonic theorizing that are less than helpful in understanding ourselves and our lives but also those modern natural scientific evolutionary and other discourses that seek to understand human nature via the deterministic laws of efficient cause.
As Murdoch, MacIntyre and others have correctly discerned, human understanding of moral agency, of the moral visions that inspire such agency and of the moral or other characters that are formed under the influence of such visions are quite irreducible to such deterministic explanation. Rather, such visions are hardly expressible other than in terms of the great cultural, religious and imaginative narratives by which human agents have ever sought to explore the possibilities of human flourishing and the forms of human character that either do or do not conduce to flourishing. Moreover, as already hinted, it is arguably in just this respect that MacIntyre is at his most Aristotelian, insofar as the value of tragic poetry for understanding the potential for good or ill of human character is also clearly appreciated in Aristotle's Poetics (Aristotle 1941b) . To be sure, while latter day virtue ethicists have often fallen over themselves to proclaim that Aristotle's ethics is naturalistic, it should not be forgotten that his ethics is grounded in a teleological naturalism in which moral life is the more or less wise pursuit of goals and purposes that inevitably resist reduction to the causal determination of natural scientific explanation. But what we need here to bear in mind is that the pursuit of moral goals is no less a matter of seeing correctly: we accomplish little of moral value unless we see in the light of moral day rather than through the fog of vanity and self-regard. In this respect, Murdoch has perhaps more than any other modern writer recognized the profound truth of Plato's myth of the cave and argued persuasively -in an albeit un-Platonic way -for the moral educational uses of literature as an effective escape route from the cave's delusions. Still, from this viewpoint, it may be that the best route to a truly illuminating virtue ethics for moral education lies not in some choice between Aristotelian moral naturalism and Platonic moral realism, but in some reconciliation of the profound insights of both these perspectives.
